A new report by the Institute for Governance Reform (IGR) has identified systemic failures within Sierra Leone’s state institutions as a major barrier to the country’s development, arguing that poor governance is driven by entrenched elite interests rather than the policies of any single political party.
The report, titled “Overcoming State Underperformance: How Incentives Can Accelerate Growth and Stability in Sierra Leone,” published on Wednesday, 19th February 2025, highlights persistent institutional dysfunction as a key factor behind slow economic progress and governance failures.
According to the IGR’s findings, successive governments have focused on replacing personnel without addressing deep-rooted structural problems in the civil service, judiciary, and parliament. As a result, oversight institutions remain underfunded and lack the autonomy needed to function effectively.
IGR also cited public expectations and political culture as contributing factors, adding that citizens’ demands for personal benefits from elected officials and attempts to influence court cases reflecting a broader culture of ‘this is our turn’ that weakens institutions.
“Just as it is common for the average Sierra Leonean to bribe a judge or magistrate to swing cases in their favour or to speak to a politician with the aim of influencing a court case, so has it become commonplace for individuals to expect direct material benefits from elected and appointed officials,” IGR report pointed out.
The report underscores that both major political parties—the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (APC)—have struggled with governance issues.
IGR highlights instances where criticisms made by the SLPP while in opposition have resurfaced under their administration, such as the use of private buildings for government offices, mismanagement of state assets, and duplication of public institutions.
Citing Afrobarometer data, the report describes a political climate marked by division and mistrust, where citizens feel either entitled to power or excluded based on which party is in control. This division, the IGR warns, fuels dysfunction and contributes to instability.
The report criticizes past and present approaches by governments, opposition parties, and international development partners as ineffective, arguing that efforts to improve governance have failed to address the political and institutional behaviors that sustain underperformance.
To address these challenges, the IGR proposes the use of performance-based incentives to improve judicial and parliamentary effectiveness. Drawing on international examples, the report suggests that structured incentives could encourage better governance practices.
For the judiciary, the report recommends performance-based assessments and the establishment of a sub-treasury to reduce executive influence. In parliament, it suggests linking performance to rewards, restoring financial independence through a sub-treasury, and better allocation of constituency development funds.
“These funds should be managed by a Commission rather than the MP. MPs should work with communities to design projects and then apply to the commission for funding,” the report emphasized.
The IGR concludes by calling for political consensus on institutional reform and more targeted investments from development partners to strengthen governance. It urges policymakers to adopt incentive-based mechanisms to drive accountability and efficiency in state institutions.
